As pirate attacks grow, shipowners take arms

Over the last two centuries, the use of military force at sea has become largely the preserve of states. The legal basis under which modern-day cargo ships -- with their often

multinational crews and ownership structures -- can use lethal weaponry is far from clear, and the IMO guidelines have no weight in international law.
Williams tells his students that their best bet is to find a reputable security company that operates with clear rules of engagement -- but that even then, it may be impossible to avoid a whole host of legal dangers.
"We are former servicemen, and as such are simple creatures, but you can guarantee the ambulance-chasers and human rights lawyers are sitting on the sidelines watching this," he says.
Some of his students say they would be happier carrying weapons -- "it's kind of a comfort blanket, I suppose," says one Afghanistan veteran. Others worry. "I haven't made up my mind yet. There are arguments for and against," said a former policeman who now works as a private investigator -- "mostly marital."
CONVENIENT?
The legal risks of bearing arms at sea are further complicated by the often complex ownership of modern merchant ships. Shipping companies routinely register vessels under flags of convenience, placing their legal ownership in jurisdictions such as Panama and Liberia where tax and other regulations are lenient. But in a case of self defence, the nationality of a ship's owners, its master and crew, and which ports it has passed through also have legal implications.
"There are multiple layers of law that might apply in any case," says John Drake, senior risk consultant with UK-based security firm AKE, another company operating in the Somali region -- albeit one that refuses to carry weaponry and only operates unarmed teams. "The thing is no one wants to be the one to take responsibility for pulling together the legislation to clarify the situation."
Naval forces operating in the Horn of Africa say that makes their work harder as well, and is one reason -- along with serious concerns over hostage safety -- they have been reluctant to board captured ships even when they are being used to attack other vessels. "Who do you call when you have, say, a Mongolian ship with a Vietnamese crew?" asked one officer involved in international counterpiracy efforts. "Sometimes it stops us from acting."
Gvosdev, at the U.S. Naval War College, agrees, and says the complexities of ownership make states less keen to intervene. "There's a feeling that if companies are going to chase the flag of convenience for tax and other reasons, they can also take on responsibility for protecting themselves," he says.
But that, says Hinchcliffe at the International Chamber of Shipping, should not let navies dodge their responsibilities. Even if shipping companies register vessels in particular ports for financial advantage, he says they still contribute to the wider global economy and deserve protection.
"What they need to do is tackle the 'mother ship' problem," he said. "We know that it probably could not be done without at least some risk to the crews being held, but it is the only way of addressing the problem. Without it, the pirates will keep growing the area of operation -- perhaps out beyond the bottom of India."
CITADEL HIDEOUT
How closely a ship is secured is most often determined by what it and its cargo are worth. High-value vessels such as seismic survey craft, drilling rigs and the occasional luxury yacht are usually well protected, and almost never taken.
In contrast, bulk carriers -- big cargo vessels which are relatively easy to board -- are typically already operating on squeezed margins, so are much less likely to carry special security personnel.
"It's a big, bad commercial world out there," says Twiss. He periodically still sails as a security contractor in the region to keep his skills up, and experienced his first pirate boarding just a few months ago.
In late 2010, the bulky former commando was leading an unarmed four-man security detail on a chemical tanker as it slowly made its way up the east African coast.
Before dawn one morning, a colleague spotted a small craft on the radar, apparently shadowing the tanker's movements. Shortly after first light, the men made out a white fishing boat. A smaller skiff was already heading towards them with young Somali men ready in the bows.
"The hairs on the back of your neck stand up," Twiss says. "You know it's going to be a long day."
As 7.62 mm AK-47 rounds slammed into their ship, Twiss and the captain abandoned the bridge, pausing only to send pre-set distress messages to the owner and international naval forces. They and the crew moved en masse to a secure space in the engine room from which they could still communicate and steer the ship -- the "citadel", in anti-piracy jargon.
Temperatures were sweltering, the predominantly Filipino crew members terrified. But after several hours the pirates appeared to have fled -- perhaps because of the impending arrival of a NATO warship. Twiss and his colleagues armed themselves with the largest spanners they could find to go room by room and check the Somalis had all gone.
Would Twiss have been happier if he and his team were carrying weapons?
"Oh God yes," he says. "The way things are going out there at the moment, you definitely need it. The problem was that in that case the flag state would not allow it."
LONG SHOT
Not everyone agrees. Some insurers are against ships carrying armed security staff. Many serving military officers say they are inherently uncomfortable with letting private guards use lethal force on the high seas. Some security companies, too, say heavy weaponry makes an already risky situation worse. They say the answer is having good advisers who ensure the ship follows best practice, help keep a constant lookout and reassure the captain during attacks.
Nonetheless, no vessel carrying armed guards has yet been pirated.
"It would be foolish of us to deny their success so far," says Wing Commander Paddy O'Kennedy, spokesman for the EU antipiracy task force EU NAVFOR. "But we do not endorse the practice and we do have concerns. We are worried that you will get an escalation of violence with the pirates and an arms race. We are also worried about how you guarantee quality of training. We know of cases where contractors have fired on fishing boats, and we are worried that innocent people could get killed."
Some in the industry even wonder if a special security effort is really necessary. There are around 35,000 ship voyages a year through the Indian Ocean, they point out: the vast majority are completely unarmed and make it through. One security veteran already working in the region said private contractors could spend months without ever seeing a pirate.
For now, insurers and most shipping companies seem willing to risk the occasional hit. Experts say piracy adds only slightly to the cost of shipments through the region. As long as cost remains negligible, world powers feel scant compulsion to take tougher action.
"The rate of suspicious approach is about 1 to 350, and hijacked is 1 to 950," Twiss tells the group. "If you were offered those odds in a betting shop you'd like to take them."
Williams takes a more personal approach to shipping firms who choose to do without security."What they are doing is gambling with the lives of crews," he says.
There have been upwards of 600 crew held hostage at any given time this year, the shipping industry says, mainly sailors from places such as Malaysia, India and Vietnam. According to data from risk firm AKE, ships taken by Somali pirates are on average now held for 187 days, up from roughly 100 in early 2010.
Source: Reuters