Iran's Allies are In Retreat - Except in the Red Sea

Iran’s Axis of Resistance - its network of allies across the Middle East, which it has nurtured and invested in heavily for decades - is under pressure and in retreat almost everywhere.

Hamas in Gaza has lost its leadership and much of its fighting force. In ceasefire negotiations, it hopes to salvage some of its influence by sharing the administration over what is left of Gaza with the Palestinian National Authority, with whom it has fought a bitter decades-long feud for influence. 

Hezbollah has been similarly hobbled in Lebanon, and is on the cusp of losing its dominant hold over the Lebanese political system.  In Syria, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) lightning takeover of government means the end of an Iranian presence - and probably the longstanding Russian presence as well.  Even in Iraq, the al-Sudani government has in recent weeks reigned in the autonomy of Iranian-backed PMF militias, fearful of being over-exposed.

In Iran itself, playing out almost unremarked upon because of an absence of Western press on the ground, hardliners are under increasing pressure. Israeli operations in Iran have had a significant impact, humiliating the regime and fueling a powerful popular sense that the theocrats are jeopardizing the economic present and the country’s future. Since the end of October, a long-running separatist insurgency has flared in the southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchistan. Iranian state media initially described security force activity in the area as an exercise. But operations have been going on for months now, with acknowledged security force and separatist deaths mounting beyond levels not seen for many years. 

At the beginning of December, a similar ‘exercise’ began in the northeast, aimed against rebels supported from Afghanistan.  With dissatisfaction with religious rule inflamed by high inflation, electricity, water and gas shortages, new repressive hijab laws and widespread unrest with the resources diverted to fund the IRGC’s activities abroad, the regime is nervous. The IRGC, evidently facing a crisis of confidence, has been conducting widespread mobilizations of its Basij internal security forces, readying them to suppress a resurgence of street protests.  A particular focus for these exercises has been oil-rich Khuzestan, where the IRGC acknowledged that a massive mobilization exercise last month was preparation to deal with what it described as ‘security threats, anti-revolutionary groups, and terrorist and takfiri networks.’ Its enemies are unlikely to allow Iran to continue the recent acceleration of its nuclear weapons program without further intervention. Taken all together, Iran is in political turmoil and internal instability threatens.

But in one of Iran’s fiefdoms, the Axis of Resistance remains strong: Yemen.

The Houthi campaign against shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden shows no signs of abating. US and UK strikes against anti-shipping missiles, drones, and supporting infrastructure have not suppressed the intensity of attacks.  Shipping companies continue to divert traffic around the Cape, and both the US and EU-led naval operations in the Red Sea, whilst effective when present, have had insufficient ships at sea to neutralize the threat. This particular battle appears stuck in a stalemate.

Sitting on the sidelines are the Sunni nations of the region. Constrained by a wish not to inflame popular sentiment broadly supportive of Hamas and the Palestinian cause, rulers in the region are silent and have not overtly joined attempts to curtail Houthi activities.  

But anger is mounting within governments at the costs that the Houthi campaign is imposing.  Between January and September, oil exports through the Red Sea fell by 50%, from an average of 8.7 to 4.0 million b/d. In a soft crude market, the extra costs of diverting around the Cape are being borne by producers. General trade and container traffic from the Gulf also has to take the long way round, inflating consumer prices. It would not be a surprise if Gulf rulers were considering deploying a small fraction of the substantial extra costs imposed on them, contemplating if some of this money might be better spent on a renewed attempt to displace or neutralize the Houthis. 

With the Houthi drone strike south of Tel Aviv on December 9, Israel will be contemplating its own action.

Gulf nations have been reluctant to take an overly antagonistic attitude to the Houthis, with the Saudis in particular seeking instead to extend and deepen the ceasefire negotiated with the Houthis in 2022 - a means of exiting a disastrous and expensive war which they had effectively lost. But patience is fraying, and with both Iran and Russia on the back foot, and the Axis of Resistance collapsing, the balance of advantage is shifting. And there is a particular annoyance that the Houthis have not withdrawn from the port of Hodeidah, part of the 2022 UN agreement which their opponents honored but which the Houthis took advantage of instead.

How to take an anti-Houthi campaign forward has been a hot topic at high-level conferences held this weekend in both Bahrain and Doha. One notion being discussed by regional leaders and security experts in attendance is the reactivation of the forces controlled by Tareq Saleh, nephew of the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh assassinated by his erstwhile Houthi allies in December 2017. 

It was Tareq Saleh’s Emirati-backed National Resistance Forces - which currently control the southwestern Yemeni coastline - that withdrew from Hodeidah in 2022, and Saleh is now pressing to take it back. Ejecting the Houthis from Hodeidah would have a significant impact on the Houthis economically, and on humanitarian operations covering Houthi areas.  But it would not necessarily have an immediate impact on the Houthis’ anti-shipping campaign if the Houthis continued to control the Yemeni coastline further north.   

There is also a risk that a re-opening of the civil war would cement the effective division of Yemen between the Houthis, the recognized government backed by the Saudis, and the southern secessionists backed by the Emiratis. Tareq Saleh might even become a fourth independent player in the mix. 

Oman, Yemen’s exasperated neighbor to the east, has always sought a unified government independent of foreign backers, a tent within which rival groups can come to terms with each other. The competing solution is a permanent division of Yemen amongst three or four factions, each with a different foreign sponsor. It’s not a clear-cut choice as to which would offer the best solution for Yemen’s long-suffering civilian population, for neighboring countries seeking stable borders, and for global shipping wishing to slip past in peace.